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1 Introduction
The ability of competition authorities to proactively detect and punish collusion is crucial
for achieving the goal of promoting and maintaining competition. Not only do the possibility
of detection and prosecution serve as strong deterrents against collusion, they also affect the
incentives of firms in existing cartels to apply for leniency programs. Successful identification
of cartels thus deters collusive activity and complements enforcement programs.
In the absence of concrete leads, using data-driven screens to flag suspicious firm con-
duct can be useful for regulators as a first step in identifying collusion. While screens cannot
substitute for direct evidence of collusion such as testimonies and records of communication,
they can provide guidance on which markets or firms to focus investigation. A growing num-
ber of countries are adopting algorithm-based screens that analyze bidding data from public
procurement auctions to flag suspicious behavior.1 More recently, the U.S. Department of
Justice announced the formation of a procurement collusion strike force whose goal includes
bolstering “data analytics employment to identify signs of potential anticompetitive, criminal
collusion.”2 Imhof et al. (2018) describes an antitrust investigation initiated on the basis of
statistical screens and resulting in successful cartel prosecution. The results from screens
can be used in court to obtain warrants, or to support civil antitrust litigation as well as
private litigation.3
Screening cartels can also be useful to stakeholders other than antitrust authorities. For
example, screening can help procurement offices counter suspected bidding rings by soliciting
new bidders more aggressively or adopting auction mechanisms that are less susceptible to
collusion. In large decentralized organizations, collusion may be organized by firm employees
against the will of CEOs (Sonnenfeld and Lawrence, 1978).4 In that context, screening tools
1A report by the OECD (OECD, 2018) gives a brief description of the screening programs used in Brazil,
Switzerland and the UK.
2Announcement of the Antitrust Division’s Procurement Collusion Strike Force, November 22, 2019.
3Baker and Rubinfeld (1999) give an overview on the use of statistical evidence in court for antitrust
litigation.
4See also Ashton and Pressey (2012), who study 56 international cartels investigated by the EU. They
find that there is involvement of individuals at the most senior levels of management (CEOs, chairpersons,
etc.) in about half of those cases.
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can help internal auditors and compliance officers contain collusive practices initiated by
employees.
Because bidding rings often adopt rotation schemes or give priority to incumbents in
project allocation, bid rotation and incumbency advantage are very often suggested as indi-
cators of collusion.5 However, it is well known that there are non-collusive cost-based expla-
nations for these allocation patterns. Bid rotation can arise under competition if marginal
costs increase with backlog. Incumbency advantage can be explained by cost asymmetries
among competitive firms or by learning-by-doing. Hence, establishing a tight link between
these bidding patterns and collusion has been difficult. As Porter (2005) describes, “An
empirical challenge is to develop tests that can discriminate between collusive and non-
cooperative explanations for rotation or incumbency patterns.”
We show that it is possible to discriminate between competitive and non-competitive
bid rotation and incumbency patterns using the logic of regression discontinuity designs
(Thistlethwaite and Campbell, 1960). We compare the backlog and incumbency status of
a bidder who wins the auction by a small margin to those of a bidder who loses by a
small margin. Although bids are endogenous, we show that under an appropriate notion of
competition satisfied in large markets, the probability that a bidder wins or loses an auction
conditional on close bids approaches 50%, regardless of the bidders’ characteristics (e.g., the
size of backlog, incumbency status, etc.). Winning and losing are “as-if-random” conditional
on close bids. As a result, even if backlog or incumbency status are correlated to costs, the
differences in these variables between close winners and close losers should vanish as the bid
difference between them approaches zero.
Conversely, we show that if covariates are not identically distributed across close winners
and losers, then bidders’ continuation values are either highly sensitive to the winning bid,
or increasing in the revenue of competing bidders (i.e. bidders internalize the revenues of
competitors). While this does not necessarily indicate illegal collusive behavior, it suggests
that the industry under examination is exhibiting unusual dynamics, and probably deserves




Importantly, bids generated by natural collusive strategies generate systematic differences
in characteristics across close winners and close losers. In fact, our tests can provide some
insight into the type of strategies used by bidders. Specific collusive strategies suggest both
a relevant covariate, and predict the sign of the difference in expected characteristics. For
example, if the bidding ring allocates projects to the incumbent bidder, close winners will
be incumbents with significantly higher probability than close losers. In contrast, if bids
are allocated using bid rotation, bidders with lower backlog will be more likely to be close
winners than close losers.
We illustrate our test using two datasets. First, we consider the sample of Ohio school
milk auctions studied by Porter and Zona (1999). Firms located around Cincinnati, Ohio
were charged with colluding on hundreds of school milk auctions by allocating markets ac-
cording to incumbency status (State of Ohio v. Louis Trauth Dairies, Inc. et al). According
to the testimony of the representatives of the colluding dairies, the firms colluded by agreeing
not to undercut the bid of the incumbent firm that had served a given school district in the
previous year. We test whether or not marginal winners are more likely to be incumbents
than marginal losers separately for the set of collusive auctions and the set of non-collusive
auctions.6 We find that for collusive auctions, marginal winners are significantly more likely
to be incumbents than marginal losers, rejecting the null of competition. In contrast, we do
not find statistically significant differences in incumbency status between marginal winners
and marginal losers among non-collusive auctions despite the fact that the sample size is
more than 10 times bigger.
Second, we apply our tests to a dataset of public procurement auctions held by munic-
ipalities from the Tohoku region of Japan. Firms in this dataset have not been prosecuted
for collusion, but there are reasons to suspect that it is present.7 To proxy for potential
6More precisely, we apply the tests separately for the set of auctions in which all of the bidders were
implicated and the set of auctions in which none of the participants were implicated.
7Kawai and Nakabayashi (2018) provide evidence that some of the firms in this dataset colluded over
procurement contracts let by the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transportation. Chassang et al.
(2020) suggest that non-competitive behavior may have been prevalent in auctions held by a different set of
Tohoku municipalities. As we discuss below, the tests presented in the current paper complement previous
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collusion, we split the sample of municipal bids into high and low bid groups depending on
whether the bid is above or below the median winning bid for the municipality holding the
auction.8 Because the purpose of collusion is to elevate prices, we expect a higher concentra-
tion of collusive auctions in the high bid group. As in the case of collusive Ohio school milk
auctions, we find that marginal winners are significantly more likely to be incumbents than
marginal losers in the high bid group. We also find that backlog is significantly lower for
marginal winners compared to marginal losers in this group. This is suggestive of collusive
behavior using both priority to incumbents and bid rotation. We do not find statistically
significant differences in the characteristics of marginal winners and marginal losers for the
low bid group.
Literature. Our work fits in the industrial organization literature interested in detecting
collusion in auctions and markets. Pioneering work in this literature include Hendricks
and Porter (1988), Baldwin et al. (1997), as well as Porter and Zona (1993, 1999). Our
contribution is particularly related to Porter and Zona (1993) who study the impact of cost
shifters such as backlog and proximity to construction sites on the bids and rank order of
bidders in auctions for road pavement projects. They find that the losing bids of suspected
ring members do not respond to cost shifters, suggesting that those bids are likely phantom
bids. Although both Porter and Zona (1993) and our paper study the relationship between
the rank order of bids and possible cost shifters to screen for collusion, the underlying idea
behind the proposed tests are different. Porter and Zona (1993) focus on the lack of incentives
among losing cartel bidders to bid in ways that reflect their true costs. Hence, their primary
focus is on losing bidders.9 Our primary focus is on differences between winners and losers.
The tests we propose are based on the idea that under collusion, close winners and losers
need not be statistically similar: under incumbency priority close winners are more likely to
be incumbents; under bid rotation close winners are likely to have lower backlog .
work by applying specifically in environments where previous tests have no bite.
8We normalize raw bids with each auction’s reserve price to make bids more comparable.
9Porter and Zona (1993) describe their tests as follows: “. . . our rank-based test is designed to detect
differences in the ordering of higher bids, as opposed to the determinants of the probability of being the
lowest bid . . .”, although parts of their paper analyze the determinants of the winner.
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Recent work seeking to detect non-competitive behavior includes Bajari and Ye (2003),
Ishii (2009), Athey et al. (2011), Conley and Decarolis (2016), Andreyanov (2017), Schurter
(2017), Kaplan et al. (2017), and Kawai and Nakabayashi (2018).10 A complementary lit-
erature focuses on known cartels and studies the practical details of collusive arrangements.
Pesendorfer (2000) studies bidding rings with and without side-payments. Asker (2010)
studies knockout auctions among members of a bidding ring. Clark et al. (2018) analyze
the breakdown of a cartel and its price implications. Other contributions (see for instance
Ohashi (2009), or Chassang and Ortner (2019)) take a design perspective and document how
changes in the auction format affect the ability of bidders to maintain collusion.
The paper shares its emphasis on general information structures with Chassang et al.
(2020), but develops a qualitatively different strategy that considerably expands the scope for
applications. In this previous work, we document that in a significant subset of procurement
auctions held in Japan, winning bids are isolated – there are very few close winners and
close losers. This pattern, as well as others, can be exploited to obtain lower bounds on the
share of non-competitive histories under general information structures. The current paper
complements this previous work by focusing on settings where the missing-bids pattern does
not arise, i.e. when close wining and losing bids are not rare. Moreover, it exploits the
information content of arbitrary bidder characteristics. This allows us to extend the analysis
to environments with intertemporal linkages such as learning by doing, or increasing marginal
costs, which Chassang et al. (2020) excludes. Our framework also lets analysts use any
available covariate data to test for collusion.
We believe that the tests proposed in this paper are well suited to complement standard
antitrust practice, as a tool to target agency attention and effort, or to justify more invasive
evidence collection. First, our test formalizes intuitive ideas often mentioned by antitrust
agencies. Second, the test is easy to implement and requires no sophisticated programming.
Third, our approach does not require detailed data on project or bidder characteristics
because the regression discontinuity design makes it less important to control for auction
and bidder heterogeneity. Fourth, our approach naturally extends to other types of auctions
10For a survey of the literature up to the mid 2000s, see Porter (2005) and Harrington (2008).
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such as handicap auctions, scoring auctions and all-pay auctions by appropriately modifying
the running variable. Finally, our approach can be easily adapted to exploit other markers
of collusion. Imagine a cartel is suspected of using geographic segmentation to allocate
projects.11 With data on the location of firms and project sites, one could assess whether
or not close winners are located nearer the project site than close losers. Another possible
marker of collusion is the extent of subcontracting and joint bidding.12 If procurement
agencies require the list of subcontractors to be specified at the time of bidding, one can test
whether or not marginal winners have more subcontractors than marginal losers.13
2 Framework
The section specifies our model of dynamic procurement. We describe our test of non-
competitive behavior in Section 3, and provide theoretical foundations in Section 4. We turn
to data in Section 5.
Game form. In each period t ∈ N, a buyer procures a single item from a finite set N
of potential supliers. The procurement contract is allocated through a sealed-bid first-price
auction with a public reserve price r, which we normalize to 1. Each potential bidder i ∈ N
decides whether to participate in each auction. Bidders incur a cost k > 0 for submitting an
actual bid bi,t ∈ [0, 1], and may prefer not to participate, denoted by bi,t = ∅.
We denote by bt = (bi,t)i∈N the profile of bids, and by ∧bt the lowest bid among partic-
ipating bidders.14 This is the winning bid. Ties are broken with uniform probability. We
denote by b−i,t ≡ (bj,t)j 6=i bids from firms other than i, and by ∧b−i,t ≡ minj 6=i bj,t the lowest
11Pesendorfer (2000) documents evidence of market division among school milk providers in Texas.
12For example, the Department of Justice maintains a document called “Price Fixing, Bid Rigging, and
Market Allocation Schemes: What They Are and What to Look For" , in which it states “Subcontracting
arrangements are often part of a bid-rigging scheme." Similar statements are found in a report by the OECD
(2013). See also Conley and Decarolis (2016) for a discussion of subcontracting and collusion.
13For example, “Subletting and Subcontracting Fair Practices Act" (Public Contract Code 4100 et seq.)
of California requires that “any person making a bid or offer to perform the work, shall, in his or her bid
or offer, set forth ... (T)he name, the location of the place of business, ... of each subcontractor who will
perform work or labor or render service to the prime contractor."
14If no bidder participates, i.e. bi = ∅ for all bidders, then by convention ∧bt = +∞.
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bid among i’s participating competitors. Let ∧b−i  bi denote the event that bidder i wins
the contract, i.e. bi is the lowest bid and possible ties are broken in favor of bidder i. Bids
are publicly revealed at the end of each period.
Costs and payoffs. In each period a profile of procurement costs ct = (ci,t)i∈N ∈ RN is
realized. Firm i’s payoff at time t from submitting bid bi ∈ [0, 1] is 1∧b−ibi(bi − ci,t) − k.
Bidders discount future payoffs using discount factor δ < 1.
State transitions. In each period t, before bidding, each bidder observes a state θt ∈ Θ,
with Θ finite, summarizing the state of the industry. The state follows an endogenous Markov
chain: θt+1 is distributed according to a probability distribution FΘ(·|θt, w∗t ), depending only
on the previous state θt, and the identity of the winning bidder w∗t ∈ arg mini∈N bi,t
Our model allows for settings in which a bidder’s procurement costs depend on backlog
or incumbency status through state variable θt. For example, θt can be a vector that tracks
how many auctions each bidder has recently won, as well as their reserve price, to capture
the effect of backlog on costs. Alternatively, θt can be a vector that tracks whether or not a
given bidder has won a particular type of auction to capture the effect of learning-by-doing.
State θt can also capture exogenous auction characteristics such as the distance between
the project site and each of the bidders, the scale of the project, or the type of work being
procured.
Information. In addition to state θt, each bidder i privately observes a signal zi,t ∈ Zi,
with Zi finite. The distribution of signal profile zt = (zi,t)i∈N ∈ Z =
∏
i∈N Zi depends only
on θt but is otherwise unrestricted. Signals may be arbitrarily correlated. We denote by
FZ(·|θ) the distribution of signals conditional on state θ.
Costs ct = (ci,t)i∈N ∈ RN are drawn independently conditional on state θt, and on each
private signal zi,t. In particular, we have that
ci,t|θt, zi,t ∼ ci,t|θt, zt, c−i,t.
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Bidder i’s cost does not provide information about the cost of other bidders beyond the
information already provided in state θt and private signal zi,t. We assume private values,
so that each bidder observes her own costs.15 This class of information structures nests
asymmetric independent private values, correlated values, and complete information. We
denote by FC(·|θt, zt) the conditional distribution of the profile of costs ct given state θt, and
signals zt.
The underlying economic environment, denoted by E , corresponds to the tuple E =
(FΘ, FZ , FC).
Observables. We now introduce variables observed by the econometrician. We denote by
xi,t ∈ X ⊂ Rn, with X finite, the characteristics of bidder i at time t that the econometrician
observes. The observables at time t, xt = (xi,t)i∈N , can be a subset of θt, a coarsening of
θt, or any variable that is predetermined at the time of bidding.16 In our application, xi,t
corresponds to measures of a bidder’s backlog or incumbency status. Given that many
bidders in our data work on projects that are not in our dataset (e,g, construction work for
other firms), our measures of backlog and incumbency are at best imperfect measures of the
backlog and incumbency status that are relevant for bidders’ costs. Because observables x
can be arbitrary noisy statistics of θt, our framework allows for unobserved heterogeneity
and measurement error.
Strategies and solution concepts. A Markov strategy σi is a mapping from information
hi,t = (θt, zi,t) and costs ci,t to bids bi,t ∈ [0, 1] ∪ {∅}. Throughout the paper, we focus on
Markov strategies, and Markov perfect equilibrium (Maskin and Tirole, 2001). A strategy
profile σ = (σi)i∈N is a Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE) if it is a perfect Bayesian equilib-
rium in Markov strategies. MPEs have received much attention in the empirical industrial
organization literature studying dynamic oligopolistic competition, starting with Ericson and
15Because the signals are allowed to be correlated, zi,t helps bidder i predict the cost of other bidders.
The main restriction is that set Z is finite. This ensures that pointwise convergence results established later
on hold uniformly over histories.
16More generally, xi,t can be any garbling (in the sense of Blackwell (1953)) of bidder i’s information at
the time of bidding in period t.
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Pakes (1995). However, as we highlight in Section 4, they are not a sufficient condition for
competition: it is possible to sustain obviously collusive strategies in MPE.
3 Empirical Strategy
We now delineate our tests of non-competitive behavior and clarify the goal of our theoretical
analysis.
Consider the problem of assessing whether firms in a given industry are engaging in
collusive bid rotation. Empirically, this implies that bidders with a low backlog (less likely
to have won in the recent past) are more likely to win than bidders with a large backlog. The
difficulty is that there may also be competitive reasons for this pattern. Suppose that firms’
procurement costs are increasing with backlog. Even if firms are competing, on average,
firms with lower backlog will have a lower cost and be more likely to win an auction than
firms with higher backlog. In this environment, a test seeking to detect collusive bid rotation
by comparing the unconditional backlog of winners and losers would yield false positives.
Our proposal is to compare the backlog of a selected group of firms: bidders that win
or lose by a small margin. Intuitively, conditioning on close bids allows us to control for
potential cost differences. The implicit hypothesis is that under competition, the identity of
the winner is as-if-random conditional on close bids. As a result, close winners and losers
should be statistically similar. If instead, close winners have consistently lower backlogs than
close losers, this is evidence of collusive bid rotation.
We operationalize this idea as follows. Denote by ∆i,t ≡ bi,t − ∧b−i,t the difference
between the bid of firm i, and the most competitive alternative bid at time t. If ∆i,t < 0,
bidder i wins the auction, if ∆i,t > 0, bidder i loses. Let xi,t be a measure (observed by
the econometrician) of firm i’s backlog before bidding at time t (alternatively it could be
incumbency, or another relevant covariate). We define coefficient β as the difference in
average backlog between close losers and close winners:
β = lim
ε↘0+
E[xi,t|∆i,t = ε]− lim
ε↗0−
E[xi,t|∆i,t = ε]. (1)
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Note: For each firm i and auction t, the standardized backlog of firm i at t is the Yen denominated
amount of work it won in the 90 days prior to auction t, re-expressed in units of standard
deviation from the firm’s time-series average. The figure is a binned scatter plot of this measure
against ∆i,t. See Section 5 for details.
Figure 1: Binned Scatter Plot of Standardized Backlog, Japanese Municipal Auctions.
We test the null of β = 0. When x denotes backlog, we expect β to be strictly positive
under bid rotation. When x denotes incumbency status, we expect β to be strictly negative if
the cartel allocates market share according to incumbency. Figure 1 foreshadows the results
of Section 5 using a dataset of Japanese procurement auctions. The figure is a binned scatter
plot that illustrates the relationship between bidder i’s 90-day backlog at time t against ∆i,t.
The null of β = 0 is rejected: the average backlog is discontinuous around ∆i,t = 0. Close
winners have a significantly lower backlog than close losers.
A heuristic motivation. The null hypothesis that β = 0 relies on the intuition that con-
ditional on close bids, allocation should be as-if random under competition. This argument
is easily formalized if we accept the premise that under competition, a bidder’s demand
conditional on information hi,t = (θt, zi,t) is sufficiently smooth.
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For all histories hi,t = (θt, zi,t) and bids b ∈ [0, 1], define bidder i’s residual demand as
Di(b|hi,t) ≡ prob(∧b−i  b|hi,t).
Di(b|hi,t) is the probability with which firm i expects to win the auction at history hi,t if
she places bid b. The probability that bidder i wins conditional on submitting a close bid
satisfies
prob(i wins |hi,t and |bi,t − ∧b−i,t| ≤ ε) =
Di(bi,t|hi,t)−Di(bi,t + ε|hi,t)
Di(bi,t − ε|hi,t)−Di(bi,t + ε|hi,t)
. (2)
It follows that whenever Di is strictly decreasing and continuously differentiable, then for
a bid-difference ε small, the probability of winning conditional on close winning and losing
bids is approximately 1/2, regardless of history hi,t. This is a straightforward consequence
of the fact that the numerator on the right-hand side of (2) is approximately εD′i(bi,t|hi,t)
and the denominator is approximately 2εD′i(bi,t|hi,t).
Lemma 1 (smooth demand). Assume that Di(·|hi,t) is differentiable, with D′i(bi|hi,t) strictly
negative and continuous in bids bi ∈ [0, 1]. For all η > 0, there exists ε > 0 small enough
such that for all histories hi,t,∣∣∣∣prob(i wins |hi,t and |bi,t − ∧b−i,t| ≤ ε)− 12
∣∣∣∣ ≤ η. (3)
Lemma 1 implies the following corollary.
Corollary 1. For all η > 0, there exists ε > 0 small enough such that for all x ∈ X,
|prob (xi = x |∆i,t ∈ (0, ε))− prob (xi,t = x |∆i,t ∈ (−ε, 0))| < η.
In words, the distribution of covariates xi,t observable to the econometrician has to be the
same for marginal winners and marginal losers.17 Whenever X is finite, Corollary 1 implies
17In addition, the result must hold conditional on any information available to the bidder ahead of
12
that the expectation of xi,t conditional on ∆ must be continuous around ∆ = 0. This is not
true in the data illustrated by Figure 1.
Why formal foundations are important. A difficulty with the heuristic argument pre-
sented so far is that there exist competitive environments in which the premise of smooth
demand is false. Consider a one-shot first price auction with an incumbent I and an en-
trant E. Costs to the incumbent and entrant are common knowledge, respectively satisfying
cI < cE. Participation cost k is equal to 0. We show in Appendix C that in any efficient
equilibrium, the residual demand faced by bidders conditional on their information is not
smooth. It involves either a kink or a discontinuity. In turn, the probability of winning is
not independent of bidder characteristics conditional on close bids: the incumbent wins with
probability 1, while the entrant wins with probability 0.
A key feature of this example is that participation cost k is zero. Hence, the entrant is
willing to participate, even if she expects to make zero profits in the auction. This gives
rise to discontinuities in firms’ residual demand, leading to a violation of Corollary 1. In
Section 4 we show that, if participation is costly, Corollary 1 holds under a suitable notion
of competition.
A rationale for smooth demand. Before we turn to formal foundations for our tests
in Section 4, we find it useful to clarify why the premise that residual demand is smooth
under competition, but not under collusion, can be defended using partial, but perhaps more
intuitive arguments.
As Dyer and Kagel (1996) and Ahmad and Minkarah (1988) describe, the bidding process
for construction projects is affected by many seemingly random factors.18 In competitive
environments these random factors are priced into bids and may smooth out bidders’ residual
demand.19 In collusive settings, there is less pressure to price in random factors, since bids
bidding. As a result, our tests can be applied to subsets of data adapted to bidders’ information in the sense
of Chassang et al. (2020). In Section 5.2 we leverage this and apply our tests separately for bids above and
below the median winning bid.
18See Kawai and Nakabayashi (2018) for a detailed discussion of these two papers.
19A behavioral model of Samuelson (2005) captures these ideas.
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are not competitive: cartel members may simply be told how to bid. In fact, there are
strong reasons to make bids predictable under collusion (Athey et al., 2004): since bids are
unrelated to costs, accidentally outbidding an opponent can lead to costly misallocation, or
even price wars. As a result, residual demand need not be smooth under collusion.
4 Theoretical Foundations
In this section we provide theoretical foundations for the hypothesis that assignment condi-
tional on close bids should be as-if random under competition. Our analysis exploits incentive
compatibility constraints specific to first-price auctions to establish this result. We begin
with a discussion of competition in dynamic auctions where past behavior and future payoffs
are linked.
4.1 Competition
Defining a solution concept capturing the essence of competition in dynamic auctions turns
out to be tricky. This is because competitiveness is a joint property of the underlying eco-
nomic environment E and bidder conduct σ. For instance, while Markov perfect equilibrium
(Maskin and Tirole, 2001) may seem intuitively competitive when the payoff-relevant state
θt evolves exogenously, this is no longer the case when the payoff-relevant state depends on
past actions. The information content of payoff-relevant states can then be used to support
sophisticated collusive behavior in Markov strategies.
Ultimately, we think that competitiveness is best understood on a spectrum where some
combinations of environment E and conduct σ are clearly competitive, some are clearly
collusive, and some are in a gray area. Two extreme cases seem to us as fairly clear-cut:
non-Markov perfect behavior is not competitive since firms are then coordinating behavior on
the basis of non-payoff relevant data; in contrast, Markov perfect behavior in large markets
is competitive.
In contrast Markov perfect behavior need not be competitive in small markets. Depending
14
on the richness of Markov state θt, MPE may support collusive behavior. Furthermore,
restricting attention to MPEs does not necessarily imply that Corollary 1 holds. We establish
these points using an explicit example described in Appendix A. We describe an environment
satisfying assumptions made so far, including positive participation costs, and exhibit an
MPE exploiting the information content of payoff-relevant states to sustain prices much
larger than costs. Bidding data generated by this MPE fails to satisfy Corollary 1: close
winners have lower average backlog than close losers.
Exchangeable winners. In large markets, where bidders cannot repeatedly interact with
one another, MPEs are intuitively competitive. In such environments, MPEs satisfy the
following form of anonymity: the identity of a recent winner does not matter to losing
bidders.20 We formalize this property as one possible definition of unambiguously competitive
auctions.
Consider an environment E and an MPE σ. For any i, j ∈ N , and state θ ∈ Θ, let
Wi(θ, j) denote bidder i’s expected continuation value conditional on state θ, and winner j:




∣∣∣θ0 = θ, w∗0 = j
]
where πi,t denotes the profits of bidder i in period t (net of participation costs).
Definition 1 (exchangeable winners). We say that winners are exchangeable if and only if
for any bidders j, j′ 6= i (including null bidder ∅ if nobody participates), and state θ ∈ Θ,
Wi(θ, j) = Wi(θ, j
′).
In other terms, conditional on losing, a bidder i is indifferent about the identity of the
winner. It can be shown that this property holds in large markets, where the identity of
future competitors is not affected by who won the current auction. Note that a bidder’s value
may still depend on whether she wins or loses the auction. The bidder is only indifferent
20These are environments in which oblivious equilibrium (Weintraub et al., 2008) coincides with MPE.
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over the identity of the winner conditional on losing.
4.2 Equilibrium beliefs conditional on close bids.
We now show that when winners are exchangeable, contract allocation conditional on close
bids is as-if random. For the results that follow, we maintain the assumption that bidders
incur a strictly positive participation cost (i.e., k > 0). This implies that competitive bidders
do not participate if they expect to lose with probability close to 1.
Take as given an environment E and an MPE σ. In order to capture bidder i’s dynamic
incentives, we define the expected value Vi conditional on allocation, winning bid, and history.
Let us denote by ζi ∈ {0, 1} bidder i’s outcome in the auction (where ζi = 1 denotes winning
the auction). For any history hi = (θ, zi), winning bid bw and allocation outcome ζi for
bidder i, let
Vi(ζi, bw|hi) ≡ EE,σ[Wi(θ, w∗)|1bi≺∧b−i = ζi,∧b = bw, hi].
Value Vi is the expected continuation value of player i depending on whether she wins the
auction, and the winning bid.
Remark 1. Conditional on winning, bidder i’s value Vi(1, bi|hi) does not depend on her own
bid bi.
This is driven by the fact that: (i) Vi controls for the current state through history hi;
(ii) state transitions depend only on the current state and the identity of the winner. In
general, continuation values upon losing may depend on the winning bid, since the winning
bid may be correlated with the identity of the winning bidder. This is no longer the case if
winners are exchangeable.
Remark 2. Take as given an allocation ζi to player i, and a history hi. When winners are
exchangeable, Vi(ζi, bw|hi) is independent of winning bid bw.
Indeed, if bidder i loses the auction, the fact that winners are exchangeable implies that
Vi(0, bw|hi) = Wi(θ, j) for any fixed bidder j 6= i, and all winning bids bw.
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Our first main result establishes that conditional on being a close winner or loser, any
bidder believes that they win with probability greater than 50%.
Proposition 1 (equilibrium beliefs conditional on close bids). Consider an environment E
and an MPE σ such that winners are exchangeable. For all η > 0 there exists ε > 0 small
enough such that, for all histories hi,t = (θt, zi,t) and bid bi,t ∈ (ε, 1− ε),
probσ(i wins |hi,t and |bi,t − ∧b−i,t| < ε) ≥ 1/2− η.
Proof. Since conditional value Vi(ζi, bw|hi) is independent of winning bid bw we drop it from
the list of arguments. Bidder i’s discounted expected payoff from bid b ∈ (ε, 1− ε) at history
hi,t = (θt, zi,t) can be written





= Di(b|hi,t)(b− κi,t) + δVi(0|hi,t)− k
where κi,t ≡ ci,t−δ(Vi(1|hi,t)−Vi(0|hi,t)) is bidder i’s cost of winning the auction, including its
impact on continuation values. Note that firm i would obtain a payoff of δVi(θt, 0) if she didn’t
submit a bid. Hence, bidder i’s participation constraint implies that Di(bi,t|hi,t)(bi,t−κi,t) ≥
k > 0, so that bi,t − κi,t ≥ k.
Since bid bi,t is optimal, for all ε > 0 we have that
Ui(bi,t|hi,t) ≥ Ui(bi,t + ε|hi,t)
⇐⇒ Di(bi,t + ε|hi,t)(bi,t + ε− κi,t) ≤ Di(bi,t|hi,t)(bi,t − κi,t), (4)
and Ui(bi,t|hi,t) ≥ Ui(bi,t − ε|hi,t)
⇐⇒ Di(bi,t − ε|hi,t)(bi,t − ε− κi,t) ≤ Di(bi,t|hi,t)(bi,t − κi,t). (5)
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Conditions (2), (4) and (5) imply that
probσ(i wins |hi,t and |bi,t − ∧b−i,t| < ε) =
Di(bi,t|hi,t)−Di(bi,t + ε|hi,t)






































is independent of bi,t. This concludes
the proof.
Proposition 1 provides a lower bound on firms’ winning probability at any given history,
conditional on close bids. Because at most one bidder can win, and because there are at least
two close bidders conditional on the existence of close bids, it cannot be that firms’ winning
probability (conditional on her information) is frequently much larger than 1/2. We now
make this argument formal. For any ε > 0, let ε-close denote the event that the winning bid
is within ε of the second lowest bid. For any environment E , MPE σ and threshold ε > 0,
let EE,σ[·| ε-close] denote the expectation over histories h conditional on the event ε-close.
Corollary 2 (as-if random bids). Consider an environment E and MPE σ such that winners
are exchangeable. For all η > 0 there exists ε > 0 small enough such that
EE,σ
[∣∣∣∣probσ(i wins |hi,t and |bi,t − ∧b−i,t| < ε)− 12
∣∣∣∣ ∣∣∣ ε-close] ≤ η. (6)
In words, winning is as-if-random conditional on close bids. An implication of Corollary
2 is that Corollary 1 (Section 3) holds whenever winners are exchangeable.
Sample implications. Corollary 2 holds under the joint distribution of bids and histories
generated by under an MPE σ. In empirical applications, however, this distribution is not
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directly observed and must be replaced by a sample counterpart. In Appendix C we show
that if (6) holds under the bidders’ beliefs, then it holds asymptotically under the sample
joint distribution of bids b and characteristic x ∈ XN observable to the econometrician.21
The reason such a result holds is that bidders get sufficient feedback about past states
and outcomes: in our framework, bidders observe both past states θ, and past bids b.
This prevents bidders from making repeated mistakes about realized bidding profiles and
characteristics.22 Expectations must match sample averages with high probability.
4.3 Drawing inferences from dissimilar winners and losers
We now present a converse: if the characteristics of close winners and losers are dissimilar,
what inferences can we draw about the underlying environment and bidder behavior? We
know that winners cannot be exchangeable, but we can in fact derive further implications
regarding bidders’ continuation values conditional on losing an auction.
Definition 2. (i) We say that bidding behavior is sensitive if there exists hi and
an assignment to i such that the value of a losing bidder Vi(0, bw|hi) is not Lips-
chitz continuous in bw.
(ii) We say that bidding behavior internalizes competitors’ revenues if there exists
a history hi, and winning bids bw > b′w such that Vi(0, bw|hi) > Vi(0, b′w|hi).
When firm conduct is sensitive, a small change in bids can have a disproportionate effect
on a losing bidder’s continuation value. When firm conduct internalizes competitor revenue,
there are circumstances in which a bidder i prefers losing to a competitor that generates
higher revenues. Note that neither property holds in large markets such that winners are
exchangeable, since in that case, continuation value Vi is independent of the winning bid.
21We show in Chassang et al. (2020) that this holds for any subset of histories adapted to the bidders’
information at the time of bidding.
22Bidders do receive feedback from past auctions in our empirical applications. Indeed, municipalities in
Japan are usually required to post auction outcomes shortly after each auction, typically within five days.
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|prob (xi,t = x |∆i,t ∈ (0, ε))− prob (xi,t = x |∆i,t ∈ (−ε, 0))| > 0.
It must be that bidding behavior under E and σ is either sensitive, or internalizes competitors’
revenues.
While neither sensitive behavior nor internalizing competitors’ revenue are unambiguous
marker of collusion, they indicate that market dynamics are very distinct from large mar-
ket dynamics, and warrant further examination. Sensitive behavior goes against the idea
that “minor causes should have minor effects,” emphasized by Maskin and Tirole (2001) as
a rationale for MPE. Internalizing competitors’ revenues is intuitively suspect, and arises
naturally in collusive equilibria.
5 Empirical Analysis
5.1 Ohio School Milk Auctions
In order to validate our test, we first apply it to the sample of Ohio school milk auctions
analyzed by Porter and Zona (1999). Porter and Zona (1999) study bidding on school milk
auctions using data collected by the state of Ohio as part of its efforts to sue dairies for bid
rigging. The dataset is an unbalanced panel of milk auctions let by Ohio school districts
spanning 11 years between 1980 and 1990 with information on the bids and the identity of
the bidders.23
Several features of the setting are worth highlighting. First, the auctions are recurring.
School districts hold auctions every year, typically between May and August to determine
the supplier of milk for the following school year. This allows us to easily track the incumbent
firm for a given auction. Second, the dataset includes bids from three bidders located around
23We use the dataset constructed by Wachs and Kertész (2019).
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Cincinnati that were charged for collusion. According to the testimony of the individuals
involved, the cartel allocated contracts according to incumbency. Aside from two years
(1983 and 1989) during which the cartel broke down, conspirators respected incumbency,
with non-incumbents submitting complementary bids.
Table 1 reports summary statistics of the data. Column (1) reports summary statistics
for all of the auctions in the sample, column (2) reports those for the subset of auctions
in which only the defendant firms participated (Non-competitive) and column (3) reports
those for the subset of auctions in which no cartel firm participated (Control). Because the
cartel broke down in 1983 and 1989 according to the testimony of the individuals who were
involved in collusion, we also report summary statistics for the sample that excludes years
1983 and 1989 for columns (2) and (3). We find that, on average, the number of bidders is
about 1.86 for the entire sample, and slightly higher for the non-competitive sample than
for the control sample. The winning bid, reported in units of dollars per half-pint of milk, is
about $0.131 for the entire sample, and slightly higher in the non-competitive sample. Table
1 also reports the average second lowest and third lowest bids.
Table 2 reports summary statistics with respect to incumbency. We define a bidder to be
an incumbent for a given school milk auction if the bidder was the winner of the district’s
auction in the previous year. Column (1) corresponds to the set of all auctions in the dataset,
while columns (2) and (3) respectively correspond to auctions in which all participants were
defendants and auctions in which none of the participants were defendants. Focusing on
the row labeled 1981 in column (1), we find that there are a total of 185 auctions in which
an incumbent firm participates. Out of these auctions, the incumbent won 136 of them, or
about 74%. Note that we lack the data needed to define incumbency for 1980, which is the
first year of the sample. The fraction of auctions in which the incumbent wins is about 80%
in column (1), 86% in column (2) if we exclude years 1983 and 1989 (83% if we include those

















































Obs. 3,754 235 189 3,267 2,658
Note: The first column corresponds to the set of all auctions, the second column corresponds
to the set of auctions in which only the defendant firms bid and the last column corresponds
to those in which no defendant firm bid.
Table 1: Summary Statistics of Auctions: Ohio School Milk Auctions.
in column (3), the differences are quite small. This highlights the general difficulty of using
incumbency patterns to detect collusion since both collusive and competitive auctions are
characterized by high rates of incumbency. As we will show below, the differences between
the two samples become pronounced only when we condition on close auctions.
Figure 2 plots the histogram of the running variable, ∆i,t = bi,t−∧b−i,t. A negative value
of ∆i,t implies that bidder i won auction t, and a positive value of ∆i,t implies that bidder i
lost auction t. Values of ∆i,t close to zero correspond to auctions in which the winner was
determined by a very small margin. The left panel of Figure 2 corresponds to the full sample,
the middle panel corresponds to the sample of non-competitive auctions and the right panel
corresponds to the control sample. There are no obvious differences in the distribution of
bid differences ∆i,t.24
24This highlights the value-added of considering covariates to detect non-competitive behavior. Tests
provided in Chassang et al. (2020) use only the information contained in the distribution of ∆i,t, and would




Win/Inc Ratio Total Win/Inc Ratio Total Win/Inc Ratio Total
1980 . . 249 0. . 4 . . 230
1981 136/185 0.74 273 6/7 0.86 12 123/162 0.76 235
1982 148/188 0.79 287 9/10 0.90 13 131/161 0.81 252
1983 162/214 0.76 318 7/10 0.70 16 150/187 0.80 274
1984 199/249 0.80 339 18/20 0.90 24 174/215 0.81 293
1985 205/260 0.79 357 18/18 1.00 22 177/226 0.78 314
1986 242/293 0.83 378 16/19 0.84 25 216/255 0.85 332
1987 236/287 0.82 411 18/20 0.90 27 211/255 0.83 358
1988 253/304 0.83 419 18/20 0.90 28 227/263 0.86 359
1989 257/332 0.77 392 13/19 0.68 30 236/289 0.82 335
1990 185/247 0.75 331 17/29 0.59 34 165/211 0.78 285
Obs. 3,754 235 3,267
Note: Column (1) corresponds to the set of all auctions, Column (2) corresponds to the set of
auctions in which only the defendant firms bid and the Column (3) corresponds to those in which
no defendant firm bid.
Table 2: Summary Statistics on Incumbency: Ohio School Milk Auctions.
Note: The left panel corresponds to the sample of all auctions, the middle corresponds to the
sample of non-competitive auctions and the right panel corresponds to the set of competitive
auctions. The horizontal axis is units of dollars.
Figure 2: Histogram of ∆i,t: Ohio School Milk Auctions.







We define the variable xi,t as a dummy variable for incumbency status, i.e., xi,t = 1 if firm i
is an incumbent in auction t, and 0 otherwise. If a cartel allocates contracts to incumbents,
we expect β to be strictly negative.
We estimate β using a local linear regression as follows:
β̂ = b̂+0 − b̂−0 , with
(b̂+0 , b̂
+






















where hn is the bandwidth and K(·) is the kernel. For our baseline estimates, we use
a coverage error rate optimal bandwidth and a triangular kernel with a bias correction
procedure as proposed in Calonico et al. (2014). Standard errors are clustered at the auction
level. We test the null H0 : β = 0, against the alternative H1 : β 6= 0.
Results. Table 3 presents the results. Panel (A) reports estimates β̂ for the sample of
auctions in which only the defendant firms participated. In column (1), we use all years
between 1980 and 1990 while in column (2), we exclude 1983 and 1989, the two years in which
the cartel purportedly broke down. In both columns, we focus on the sample of auctions
in which there is an incumbent. We find that the gap β in incumbency rates across close
losers and winner is negative (−0.300) and marginally statistically significant (p = 0.087) for
column (1). The point estimate implies that the marginal winner is about 30.0 percentage
points more likely to be an incumbent than the marginal loser. The bandwidth used for
estimation is 0.004, or 0.4 cents. In column (2), we find that the estimate is −0.381, and
statistically significant at the 5 percent level.
Panel (B) reports findings for the set of control auctions. We find that the regression
discontinuity estimate is −0.045 in column (1), which is not statistically different from zero.
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Because there is no reason to expect 1983 and 1989 to be any different from other years for
non-colluding firms, we do not expect any significant differences between column (1) and
column (2) for Panel (B). Indeed, the estimate of β in column (2) is −0.067, and statistically
indistinguishable from 0.
Overall, the results of Table 3 suggest that our test has reasonable power and size in
practice. Figure 3 illustrates the binned scatter plots that correspond to the results in Table 3.
The left panel of the figure corresponds to the sample of non-competitive auctions excluding
1983 and 1989, and the right panel corresponds to the sample of all control auctions. The left
panel of the figure displays a visible discontinuity in incumbency status between marginal
winners and marginal losers while the right panel of the figure shows a smooth continuous
relationship between ∆i,t and incumbency status. As it is clear from the figure, incumbents
win with high probability even among the competitive sample. It is only by looking at
marginal auctions that we find differential rates of incumbency between the two samples.
5.2 Public Procurement Auctions in Japan
Our second dataset consists of bids submitted by construction firms participating in auctions
for construction projects let by 16 municipalities in the Tohoku region of Japan. Our baseline
sample consists of roughly 11,000 procurement auctions taking place between 2004 and 2018.
The total award amount for these auctions is about 232 billion yen, or about $2.3 billion
U.S. dollars. No firm has been charged for colluding in any of the auctions in our sample.
However, as we note in the Introduction, results in Kawai and Nakabayashi (2018) and
Chassang et al. (2020) suggest that at least some of these auctions might be collusive.























Panel (A) corresponds to the sample of auctions in which only
the defendant bidders bid. Panel (B) corresponds to the sample
of control auctions in which none of the defendant bidders bid.
Standard errors are clustered at the auction level and reported in
parenthesis. The table also reports the bandwidth h used for the
estimation. *, **, and *** respectively denote significance at the
10%, 5%, and 1% levels.
Table 3: Regression Discontinuity Estimates: Ohio School Milk Auctions.
competitive behavior exploiting isolated winning bids (Chassang et al., 2020) do not apply.25
In the Online Appendix, we show that our findings extend to the sample of all of municipal-
ities from which we have obtained data. This is not surprising since it is likely that cartels
are operating in the excluded cities.
25In order to choose the set of municipalities to include in our sample, we first compute the density of the
running variable for each municipality. The running variable, ∆i,t is defined as ∆i,t = bi,t − ∧b−i,t where







where f∆(d) is the density of ∆. In municipalities with isolated bids, there will be a trough in the density of
f∆ around 0, and the inequality is not satisfied. We also drop municipalities in which f∆ exhibits a mass at
0. We do so by running a McCrary test (McCrary, 2008) on the running variable and dropping municipalities
with p-values less than 0.05. The auctions in these municipalities have binding price floors.
26
Note: Left panel corresponds to column (2) Panel (A) of Table 3 and bottom panels correspond
to column (1), Panel (B) of Table 3.
Figure 3: Binned Scatter Plot for Incumbency: Ohio School Milk Auctions
5.2.1 Data and Empirical Implementation
Data and institutional background. Auctions are first-price sealed bid and the low-
est bidder is awarded the project subject to the reserve price. Some of the municipalities
use public reserve prices and others use secret reserve prices.26 For example, in 2012, 7
municipalities used public reserve prices, 8 municipalities used secret reserve prices, and 1
municipality used both. The lowest bid was rejected in about 12.5% of the overall sample.27
Online Appendix B shows that our findings are qualitatively unchanged for the subset of
municipalities with a public reserve price.
Our data includes all bids, the identity of bidders, and a brief description of the construc-
tion project. Column (1) of Table 4 reports summary statistics of the auctions. On average,
26Proposition 1 and Corollary 2 extend as stated to auctions with a secret reserve price.
27It is very common in auctions for buyers to retain the option of rejecting the lowest bid when the buyer
believes that the price is high. The fraction of auctions in which the low bid is rejected in our sample is
comparable to other settings with a secret reserve price. For example, in their study of federal offshore oil
and gas drainage lease sales, Hendricks and Porter (1988) report that the most competitive bid was rejected




Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Reserve (Mil. Yen) 22.26 77.14
Winning Bid (Mil. Yen) 20.71 71.78
Win Bid/Reserve 0.926 0.083
# of Bidders 6.80 4.21
Incumbent Participates (0/1) 0.044 0.204
# of Auctions Participated 22.56 45.93
# of Wins 3.32 6.97
Raw Backlog (90-Day) 4.11 17.16
Raw Backlog (180-Day) 6.45 22.85
Obs. 11,207 3,377
Note: The reserve price, winning bid, and backlog measures are reported in units of
millions of yen.
Table 4: Summary Statistics of Auctions and Bidders: Municipal Auctions from Japan.
the reserve price is 22.26 million yen, or about 222 000 US dollars. The average winning bid
is 20.71 million yen. The average ratio of the winning bid to the reserve is about 92.6%. On
average, 6.80 bidders participate in each auction. Column (2) reports summary statistics of
the bidders in our sample. Bidders in our sample participate on average in 22.56 auctions
and win on average 3.32 times. The table also reports summary statistics on incumbents
and the amount of backlog of the firms. We discuss how we define these variables next.
Empirical implementation. Our first covariate of interest is the firms’ backlog. We
consider both raw backlog and standardized backlog. We define the raw backlog of firm i
at auction t as either the 90-day or 180-day cumulative size (measured by the reserve price)
of projects won by firm i. We define the 90-day and 180-day backlogs, denoted by xB90i,t and
28





where rt denotes the reserve price of auction t and T kt denotes the set of auctions in our
sample that take place in the k ∈ {90, 180} days prior to auction t. We make sure not to
include auction t in T kt since its outcome is not in the information set of bidders at time
t. Although the raw backlog is a natural metric for capturing the amount of work recently
awarded to a firm, variation in raw backlog captures both intertemporal change in backlog
as well as heterogeneity in firm size. In order to construct a measure of backlog that only
captures the intertemporal variation, we standardize the raw backlog at the firm level, using
its within-firm mean and standard deviation. The 90-day and 180-day standardized backlogs,
xB90i,t and x
B180












is the within-firm mean of xBki,t and σxBki is the within-firm standard deviation of
xBki,t . Because standardized backlog is defined relative to the firm’s own historical average,
xBki,t is zero if firm i’s raw backlog is equal to its time-series average at the time of auction t.
In Online Appendix B, we also consider an alternative definition of standardized backlog in









to compute the within-firm mean and standard deviation. The results are very
similar.
We emphasize that all of our backlog measures are, at best, noisy measures of the firms’
true cost-relevant backlog. The number of days we use to define our backlog measures (90 or
180 days) is arbitrary, and most firms are likely to work on projects that are not included in
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our sample, or our measures of backlog.28 This does not invalidate our test. As we discussed
in Section 2, variables observable to the econometrician can be imperfect and imprecise.
Corollary 1 holds regardless.
Column (2) of Table 4 reports summary statistics of raw backlog in millions of yen. The
average 90-day backlog is around 4.11 million yen and the average 180-day backlog is around
6.45 million yen. Standardized backlog averages to zero for each firm by construction.
Another covariate of interest is whether or not a given firm is an incumbent for a given
project. We define a firm to be an incumbent if it is the winner of the previous auction
with the same project name let by the same municipality. To give an example, the city of
Miyako in Iwate prefecture held procurement auctions with the project name “Restoration of
Yagisawa public housing complex” on 3 occasions, November 22, 2011, September 19, 2012,
and December 16, 2014. A firm named Kikuchi Painting won each time. We define this firm
to be the incumbent in the second and third auctions. We define all other participants in
the second and third auctions to be non-incumbents. We do not define incumbency status
for any of the bidders in the first auction. Similarly, if there is only one auction for a given
project name in a municipality, we do not define incumbency for any bidders. Column (1)
of Table 4 reports summary statistics of incumbency status. There is an incumbent bidder
in 4.4% of the auctions in our sample.
The running variable is ∆i,t = bi,t − ∧b−i,t, where bids are normalized by the reserve
price. The left panel of Figure 4 is the histogram of ∆i,t. The distribution is skewed to the
right of zero because the average number of bidders is 6.80 (∆i,t is negative for only one
bidder per auction, and it is positive for all of the losing bidders). Because we report our
regression discontinuity results separately for the set of bids above and below the median
winning bid for the municipality letting the auction, the next two panels of Figure 4 plot
28Many bidders who participate in auctions let by municipal governments also participate in auctions
that are let by the Ministry of Land Infrastructure and Transportation and prefectural governments. Many
firms also do work for other private firms.
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the histogram of ∆i,t separately for the two sets of auctions. The middle panel corresponds
to the sample of bids below the municipal median and the right panel corresponds to bids
above the median.
Note: The left panel corresponds to the histogram of ∆i,t for the entire sample. The middle panel
corresponds to the sample of bids below the median winning bid of the relevant municipality. The right
panel corresponds to the sample of bids above the median. The histogram is truncated at ∆i,t = −0.1 and
∆i,t = 0.1 for readability.
Figure 4: Histogram of ∆i,t: Municipal Auctions from Japan.
As before, we estimate discontinuities in the expectation of xi,t as a function of ∆i,t using
a local linear regression with a coverage error rate optimal bandwidth and a triangular kernel
with a bias correction procedure as proposed in Calonico et al. (2014).29 Standard errors are
clustered at the auction level.
5.2.2 Results
Table 5 reports estimates of discontinuity β. We distinguish statistics computed for the
subset of bids above the municipality median (Panel (A)) and statistics computed for the
subset of bids below the median (Panel (B)).30 We expect the latter set of bids to be less
collusive than the former.
29We restrict our sample to auctions in which bid difference |∆| is less than 20% of the reserve price:
often, bids that are more than 20% lower than the second lowest bid are likely to be misrecorded.
30More precisely, we compute the median winning bid for each municipality. We then categorize bids
according to whether or not they are higher or lower than the median.
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High winning bids. Panel (A), column (1) of Table 5 reports estimates of discontinuity
β for the 90-day backlog (measured in millions of yen) for the sample of bids above the
municipality-level median. We find that the 90-day backlog of marginal losers is on average
5.57 million yen higher than that of marginal winners. The estimate is statistically significant
at the 5% level. The coverage error rate optimal bandwidth we use is 0.016, or about 1.6% of
the reserve price. Column (2) reports estimate β for the 90-day standardized backlog. The
average standardized backlog of marginal losers is higher than that of marginal winners by
0.24 units of standard deviation. The estimate is statistically significant at the 1% level.31
Columns (3) and (4) report our results for 180-day backlog. The 180-day backlog of marginal
losers is on average 9.54 million yen and 0.22 standard deviations higher than that of marginal
winners.32
Column (5) reports estimates of β using incumbency status as the outcome variable. We
find that marginal losers are about 26.0 percentage points less likely to be an incumbent
than marginal winners. We only use the set of auctions in which there is an incumbent
for estimation. Based on these five regression results, we can confidently reject the null of
competition in this sample.
Low winning bids. Panel (B) reports the results for the sample of bids that are below the
median winning bid. Estimates of β are not statistically significant for columns (1) - (4) at
the 5% level. In the case of incumbency, we find that marginal winners are more likely to be
incumbents than marginal losers. While it seems possible that the sample of bids in Panel
31Note that the sample sizes for columns (1) and (2) are slightly different. This reflects the fact that we
can define the standardized backlog only for firms that win at least once in our sample. For firms that never
win any contracts, the within-firm standard deviation of backlog is zero, and xBki,t is undefined.
32Note that the sample size in column (4) is larger than in column (2). Suppose that a firm participates
twice in the sample, say, January 1, 2015 and May 1, 2015. Suppose that the firm wins the first auction.
According to our 90-day backlog measure, the firm’s backlog would be zero for both auctions. Hence, we
cannot define the standardized backlog for this firm. However, according to our 180-day backlog measure,
the firm has a positive backlog in the second auction. Hence, we can compute the within-firm standard
deviation for 180-day backlog, but not for 90-day backlog.
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(B) include some non-competitive bids, the overall results in Table 5 are consistent with the
notion that there is less collusion among bidders that submit low bids. We note that lack
of statistical significance in Panel (B) is unlikely to be driven by the smaller sample size
since Panel (A) and (B) contain the same number of bids for which ∆i,t is less than zero.33
Hence, the effective sample sizes are similar. Online Appendix B considers an alternative
way of partitioning the sample in which we divide auctions to high bid auctions and low bid
auctions according to whether or not the winning bid is above or below the median. We
find similar results as Table 5 for that case despite the fact that the sample sizes for the two
partitions are roughly the same.
Figure 5 displays binned scatter plots corresponding to the regression results reported in
columns (1) and (2) of Table 5. The top panels correspond to the results in the sample of
high bids (Panel (A)) and the bottom panels correspond to the sample of low bids (Panel
(B)). The left two panels plot the raw 90-day backlog against ∆ and the right two panels
plot the standardized 90-day backlog against ∆.
There is a modest discontinuity in the binned averages at ∆ = 0 in the top left panel,
corresponding to the results of column (1) of Panel (A), Table 5. The discontinuity in the
binned averages for the standardized backlog (top right panel) is more visible. The top right
panel corresponds to column (2) of Panel (A). In contrast, the graphs in the bottom panels,
corresponding to columns (1) and (2) of Panel (B), do not exhibit any clear discontinuities
at ∆ = 0.
Figure 6 displays binned scatter plots corresponding to columns (3) and (4). Similar
to the case of 90-day backlog, the discontinuity is somewhat more modest in the top left
33Recall that we partition the sample according to whether or not a bid is above or below the median
winning bid.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
90-Day Backlog 180-Day Backlog Incumbent














h 0.016 0.017 0.016 0.021 0.034














h 0.024 0.030 0.021 0.027 0.026
Obs. 15,580 14,438 15,580 14,447 488
Note: Panel (A) corresponds to the sample of bids that are above the median winning bid.
Panel (B) corresponds to the sample of bids below the median winning bid. Standard errors are
clustered at the auction level and reported in parenthesis. The table also reports the bandwidth
h used for the estimation. *, **, and *** respectively denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and
1% levels.
Table 5: Regression Discontinuity Estimates: Municipal Auctions from Japan.
panel and quite visible in the top right panel. The top left panel corresponds to the results
reported in column (3) of Panel (A) and the top right panel corresponds to that in column
(4) of Panel (A). There are no visible discontinuities in the outcome variable for the bottom
panels, corresponding to columns (3) and (4) of Panel (B).
Figure 7 shows binned scatter plots corresponding to column (5) of Table 5. The discon-
tinuity in the binned averages is visible in the top panel.
5.2.3 A Placebo Test
Because the precise order of the losing bidders is unimportant for allocation by a cartel, it
seems plausible that bidding rings would not have specific rules for determining which bidder
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Note: Top panels correspond to Panel (A) of Table 5 and bottom panels correspond to Panel (B)
of Table 5. Left panels correspond to 90-day Backlog and the right panels correspond to 90-day
standardized backlog.
Figure 5: Binned Scatter Plot for 90-Day Raw Backlog and 90-Day Standardized Backlog:
Municipal Auctions from Japan.
should bid the second or third lowest. If this is the case, we should not expect significant
differences in backlog or incumbency status between marginally second and marginally third
place bidders for both competitive and non-competitive auctions. This suggests the following
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Note: Top panels correspond to Panel (A) of Table 5 and bottom panels correspond to Panel
(B) of Table 5. Left panels correspond to 180-day Backlog and the right panels correspond to
180-day standardized backlog.
Figure 6: Binned Scatter Plot for 180-Day Raw Backlog and 180-Day Standardized Backlog:
Municipal Auctions from Japan.
placebo test.
For any non-winning bidder i, define ∆2i,t ≡ bi,t −min{bj,t s.t. j 6= i and j loses} as the
bid differences computed in data from which winning bids are excluded. Bid difference ∆2i,t is
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Note: Top panels correspond to Panel (A) of Table 5 and bottom
panels correspond to Panel (B) of Table 5.
Figure 7: Binned Scatter Plot for Incumbency: Municipal Auctions from Japan.
negative for the second lowest bidders and positive for other bidders. Even under collusion,
we do not expect that there should be systematic differences in the mean backlog and mean
incumbency of close second and third (or fourth, fifth, etc.) bidders.
Table 6 reports estimates of the discontinuity in backlog and incumbency around ∆2i,t = 0.
The top panel correspond to the sample of bids that are higher than the median winning
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
90-Day Backlog 180-Day Backlog Incumbent














h 0.016 0.010 0.015 0.013 0.026














h 0.020 0.025 0.020 0.026 0.020
Obs. 10,796 9,795 10,796 9,805 317
Note: Panel (A) corresponds to the sample of bid that are above the median winning bid. Panel
(B) corresponds to the sample of bids that are below the median winning bid. Standard errors
are clustered at the auction level and reported in parenthesis. The forcing variable is ∆2. The
table also reports the bandwidth h used for the estimation. *, **, and *** respectively denote
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.
Table 6: Placebo: Regression Discontinuity Estimate with Respect to ∆2
bid. Unlike in Panel (A) of Table 5, discontinuity estimates are statistically insignificant
at the 5% level in Panel (A) of Table 6. The bottom panel corresponds to the sample of
bids that are lower than the median. Unsurprisingly, the same holds for Panel (B). Binned
scatter plots corresponding to these estimates are given in Online Appendix B.
6 Discussion
This paper proposes a novel method to screen for non-competitive behavior using covariates
such as backlog and incumbency status. While many practitioners have advocated using
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these patterns to screen for collusion, identifying allocation patterns that reflect agreements
among cartels from those that simply reflect bidder cost heterogeneity has been difficult. Our
contribution is to make this possible by conditioning on auctions that are determined by a
close margin. Our approach is easy to implement, requires no sophisticated programming,
and is fairly robust to model misspecification. In addition, our approach can easily be
adapted to formulate tests of non-competitive behavior exploiting any observed covariate
suspected to reflect collusive strategies, such as geographic segmentation, subcontracting, or
joint bidding. Our approach can also be extended to other auction formats such as handicap
auctions, scoring auctions and all-pay auctions.
We end the paper with a discussion of practical aspects of our tests: (i) the relation
between the rejection of the test and collusion and (ii) firms’ responses to antitrust oversight.
Rejection of the test and collusion. Section 4 argues that the bidding patterns in
our datasets cannot be rationalized by suitably competitive behavior under fairly general
information structures.
While this does not necessarily imply bidder collusion, results in Section 5 suggest a
correlation between the rejection of the test and non-competitive behavior. Firms bidding
for school milk contracts that were charged with collusion fail our tests, while firms who
were not charged with collusion pass; the sample of bids that are relatively high fail our
tests, while the sample of bids that are relatively low pass. This suggests that our test are
sufficiently powered to flag potential cartels, and warrant further investigation.
Firm response to screening. Screens for collusion are perhaps most useful when firms are
unaware of the details of the screening technology. When screens are known to the colluders
they can potentially adapt their behavior to avoid detection. Are screens for collusion still
useful if cartels adapt? Are there tests that reduce the incentives of cartels, and don’t harm
competitive industries? We study these and related issues in our companion paper, Ortner
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et al. (2020).
We say that a test of collusive behavior is safe if the rate of false positives vanishes as the
number of observations grows. The tests proposed in the current paper satisfy this property.
Ortner et al. (2020) shows that antitrust oversight based on safe tests always reduces the set
of enforceable collusive schemes available to cartels. Put differently, even if firms know they
are being monitored and adapt their play accordingly, screens based on safe tests always
make cartels worse-off.
Moreover, as we illustrate in Ortner et al. (2020), adaptive responses by cartels may
themselves lead to suspicious bidding patterns that can also be detected. Consider, for
example, the test that compares the incumbency status of marginal winners and marginal
losers. If the cartel has a rule of allocating projects to incumbents and wishes to maintain
this rule, then the cartel needs to have the lowest bidder bid substantially lower than the
second lowest bidder to avoid detection. However, this would generate isolated winning bids
similar to the pattern documented in Chassang et al. (2020). Hence, avoiding one test may
lead cartels to bid in ways that lead to rejection of other tests. Alternatively, the cartel can
change its allocation rule so that incumbents are not always guaranteed to win. However,
changing the allocation rule may reduce efficiency and increase the cost of coordination. This
reduces bidders’ incentives to collude.
Online Appendix – Not for Publication
A Examples
A.1 An example of non-smooth demand.
Consider a complete information auction with an incumbent I and an entrant E with re-
spective known costs cI < cE. Assume that bidding cost k is zero.
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Lemma A.1 (non-smooth demand). In any efficient equilibrium in weakly undominated
strategies, the incumbent wins with bid cE with probability 1. The density of the entrant’s
bid below cE is 0. The density of the entrant’s bids above cE is strictly positive and bounded




Proof. In an efficient equilibrium in weakly undominated strategies, the incumbent cannot
bid above cE with positive probability: the entrant’s optimal bid would win with positive
probability.
In turn, the entrant cannot bid below cE. This implies that the incumbent’s optimal bid
is cE. Optimality of cE implies that for any ε > 0,
DI(cE + ε)(cE + ε− cI) ≤ DI(cE)(cE − cI) = cE − cI ⇐⇒
DI(cE + ε)− 1
ε
≤ − 1
cE + ε− cI
.
A.2 A collusive Markov perfect equilibrium
We now describe an environment and an MPE which satisfy our assumptions, including
positive participation costs, but nevertheless supports collusive behavior and fails to pass
our tests.
Two bidders i ∈ {1, 2} compete for contracts. Bidder 1 has a publicly observable cost
cH > 0 at even periods, and a publicly observable cost cL ∈ (0, cH) at odd periods. Bidder 2
has i.i.d. costs, equal to cL with probability q > 50%, and equal to cH with probability 1−q.
Bidder 2’s cost is her private information. Auctions have reserve price r = 1 > cH + κ. Let
ĉ = qcL + (1− q)cH be bidder 2’s expected cost. We assume that δ < 1 is sufficiently large,
so that cH > max{r(1− δ) + (cL − k)δ, (r − k)(1− δ) + δĉ}.
For simplicity, we expand the bidding space to deal with tied bids. For every bid b, we
add bid b−, equal in value to b, but such that b− ≺ b. We also consider a degenerate case
where the impact of the state on costs is vanishingly small.34 The state θt keeps track of:
• Is time period t ∈ N even or odd (i.e. t mod 2)?
• Has any bidder won the auction both at times 2t and 2t+ 1 the past?
34This information can be made payoff relevant in different ways, for instance by shifting costs slightly as
a function of the state.
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• Who has won the auction in the last period?
The collusive equilibrium we construct is as follows. If at any point in the past a bidder
has won the auction in consecutive even and odd periods, or no player won an auction,
players bid according to a static Nash equilibrium.35 If this is not the case, then:
• If t mod 2 = 0, bidder 1 participates, and bids r; bidder 2 participates only if her cost
is cL, and bids r−.
• If t mod 2 = 1, and bidder 1 won in the previous period, then only bidder 2 partici-
pates, and bids r.
• If t mod 2 = 1, and bidder 2 won in the previous period, then only bidder 1 partici-
pates, and bids r.
One can check that, when discount factor δ high enough, this is a Markov perfect equi-
librium. Furthermore, bidder 2 is the only close winner, and conditional on being a close
winner, has an expected 1-period backlog equal to 1 − q. Bidder 1 is the only close loser,
and conditional on being a close loser, bidder 1 has an expected 1-period backlog equal to
q > 1− q.
Note that winners are not exchangeable under this equilibrium. Indeed, each bidder’s
continuation value when her opponent wins is strictly larger than her continuation value
when no bidder wins. Indeed, when no bidder wins, players revert to static Nash behavior.
B Further Empirics
In this section, we first present the binned scatter plots corresponding to the regression
results in Table 6, Section 5. We next present a series of results that show robustness of the
results that we report in Table 5. In particular, we present estimates of discontinuities when
we partition auctions into two depending on whether or not the winning bid is above or
below the median. This alternative way of partitioning equates the sample sizes across the
two. We next report the results from using an alternative way of standardizing the backlog
so that the it is measurable with respect to hi,t. We also report the results when we limit
our sample to the municipalities that use public reserve prices for their auctions. Finally, we
report findings for the entire sample of auctions for which we have data.
35For t even or odd, the stage game has a Nash equilibrium in which bidder 1 randomizes between entering
or not, and bidder 2 enters with probability 1 if her cost is cL (earning profits cH − cL), and enters with
probability 0 if her cost is cH .
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Omitted binned scatter plots for Table 6. Figures B.1, B.2 and B.3 are the binned
scatter plots corresponding to Table 6. In all of the panels, the horizontal axis corresponds
to values ∆2i,t ≡ bi,t − min{bj,t, s.t.j 6= i and j loses} for losing bidders i. A small negative
value of ∆2i,t corresponds to a bid that is second lowest, but close to being third lowest. A
small positive value of ∆2i,t corresponds to a bid that was higher than, but close to the second
lowest bid.
The panels in Figure B.1 are the binned scatter plots that correspond to columns (1)
and (2) of Table 6. The panels in Figure B.2 correspond to columns (3) and (4). The panels
in Figure B.3 correspond to column (5). The top panels of each figure plot the outcome
variable for the sample of bids that are above the municipal median. The bottom panels
correspond to the sample of bids that are below the median. Unlike our results for marginal
winners and marginal losers, the figures do not show any discontinuities around ∆2i,t = 0.
Partitioning auctions by the winning bid. In our main analysis, we partition the
sample according to whether or not they are above or below the median winning bid. This
results in the sample size of the two partitions to be unequal. In order to show that our results
are not driven by differences in the sample size, we consider an alternative partitioning in
which we divide auctions according to whether or not the winning bid is above or below the
median winning bid. This partitioning results in the same number of auctions (and hence,
roughly the same number of bids) above and below the median.
Table B.1 reports the results. The top panel corresponds to the sample of bids submitted
in auctions in which the winning bid is higher than the median. We find that the estimate
of β is statistically significant for all five regressions. The bottom panel corresponds to the
sample of bids submitted in auctions in which the winning bid is below the median. We find
that in Panel (B), none of the estimates of β are statistically significant at the 5%. Note that
the sample sizes in Panel (A) and (B) are roughly equal. The results of Table B.1 suggests
that sample sizes are not driving our results in the main text.
Alternative standardization of backlog. In the main specification, we define the stan-
dardized backlog by subtracting the within-firm mean from the raw backlog and then dividing
it by the within-firm standard error. Strictly speaking, standardized backlog defined this
way is not measurable with respect to hi,t as required by the theory. In order to define an
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Note: Top panels correspond to columns (1) and (2) of Panel (A) of Table 6. Bottom panels
correspond to columns (1) and (2) of Panel (B) of Table 6.
Figure B.1: Binned Scatter Plot for 90-Day Backlog with Respect to ∆2: Municipal Auctions
from Japan.
outcome variable that is perfectly consistent with the theory, we consider an alternative stan-
dardization of backlog in which we use the mean and standard error of the rolling backlog
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Note: Top panels correspond to columns (3) and (4) of Panel (A) of Table 6. Bottom panels
correspond to columns (3) and (4) of Panel (B) of Table 6.


























Note: The top panel corresponds to column (5), Panel (A) of
Table 6. The bottom panel corresponds to column (5), Panel
(B) of Table 6.
Figure B.3: Binned Scatter Plot for Incumbent with Respect to ∆2: Municipal Auctions
from Japan.









is the standard deviation of firm i’s
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
90-Day Backlog 180-Day Backlog Incumbent














h 0.014 0.019 0.013 0.025 0.031














h 0.027 0.021 0.024 0.021 0.027
Obs. 33,100 30,739 33,100 30,770 1,032
Note: We partition auctions into two depending on whether or not the winning bid is above or
below the median. Panel (A) corresponds to the bids of auctions that are above the median.
Panel (B) corresponds to the bids of auctions that are below the median. Standard errors are
clustered at the auction level and reported in parenthesis. *, **, and *** respectively denote
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.
Table B.1: Partitioning Sample by Auctions: Municipal Auctions from Japan.








The difference between this definition and the one in the main text is that we now consider
only auctions that take place before auction t in the summation (τ < t). Note that the new
definition of standardized backlog is measurable with respect to hi,t.
We estimate β using a local linear regression as follows:
β̂ = b̂+0 − b̂−0 , with
(b̂+0 , b̂
+





























Note that we condition our regression discontinuity estimate on the event that {xBki,t 6= 0}.
Because this event is measurable with respect to hi,t, Corollary 2 holds for this case.
(1) (2)
90-Day 180-Day



















Note: Panel (A) corresponds to the sample of bids above the median
winning bid. Panel (B) corresponds to the sample of bids below the
median. Standard errors are clustered at the auction level and reported in
parenthesis. The table also reports the bandwidth h used for the estimation.
*, **, and *** respectively denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.
Table B.2: Alternative Standardization of Backlog: Municipal Auctions from Japan.
Table B.2 reports the results. Panel (A) corresponds to the sample of bids above the
median winning bid and Panel (B) corresponds to the sample of bids below the median. The
estimates for Panel (A) are statistically significant at the 5% level while the estimates in
Panel (B) are not. The results of Table B.2 are similar to the results we report in column
(2) and (4) of Table 5.
Results for the sample of auctions with a public reserve price. We now report the
results of our analysis when we restrict the sample to auctions let by municipalities using
public reserve prices. Table B.3 reports results from adapting the analysis of Table 5 to
this subset. Panel (A) of Table B.3 reports estimation results for the set of bids above the
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
90-Day Backlog 180-Day Backlog Incumbent














h 0.007 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.009














h 0.021 0.022 0.019 0.018 0.017
Obs. 2,883 2,675 2,883 2,676 61
Note: Panel (A) corresponds to the sample of bids above the median. Panel (B) corresponds
to the sample of bids below the median. Standard errors are clustered at the auction level and
reported in parenthesis. The table also reports the bandwidth h used for the estimation. *, **,
and *** respectively denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.
Table B.3: Restricting the Sample to Municipalities with Public Reserve Price.
municipal median.36 Although the estimate of β is not statistically significant for the 90-
day raw backlog in column (1), we find statistically significant differences between marginal
losers and marginal winners for other measures of backlog in columns (2), (3), and (4). These
results are qualitatively similar to those reported in Table 5. The results overall strongly
suggest that there are non-competitive auctions among the sample of public reserve auctions
in which a close winner submits a high bid.
In Panel (B), we report the estimated results for the set of low bids. We find that there
are no statistically significant differences between the marginal winner and the marginal loser
for this subsample, implying that we cannot reject the null of competition.
36As before, we compute the median winning bid for each municipality and divide the sample according
to whether or not a bid is above or below the municipal median.
49
All municipalities. We now discuss the results of our tests when we include auctions
from Japanese municipalities dropped from our main analysis. There are a total of 109
municipalities for which we have auction data. In order to construct the dataset used in
Section 5, we drop municipalities for which the distribution of ∆ has a missing mass at 0
(71 municipalities) and those for which the distribution of ∆ has a point mass at exactly 0
(22 municipalities).
Figure B.4 plots the histograms of ∆i,t for auctions let by the municipalities with missing
mass in the distribution of ∆i,t at 0 (first row) and for those let by municipalities with a mass
in the distribution of ∆i,t at exactly zero (second row). The left two panels correspond to
the histogram for all of the auctions let by each of the groups of municipalities. The middle
and right panels correspond to the histogram for bids below the municipal median (middle
panel) and above the municipal median (right panel).
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Note: The top panels correspond to auctions from 71 municipalities with missing mass in the
distribution of ∆i,t at zero. The bottom panels correspond to auctions from 22 municipalities
with a mass in the distribution of ∆i,t at exactly zero. The left panels correspond to all auctions
let by each of these groups, the middle panels condition on the winning bids to be below the
municipality median and the right panels condition on the winning bids to be above the median.
Figure B.4: Histogram of ∆i,t: Municipal Auctions from Japan.
The missing mass in the distribution of ∆i,t, apparent in the top panels, has previously
been documented in Chassang et al. (2020). In that paper, we show that this distinctive
pattern in the distribution of ∆i,t is inconsistent with competitive bidding under fairly general
conditions. Because our previous paper specifically focuses on the implications of these
patterns, we opted to exclude these municipalities in our baseline analysis.
The distributions of ∆i,t in the bottom panels have spikes at zero which are the result
of binding price floors. Price floors can result in multiple bidders bidding exactly at the
price floor. Note that because the spikes are generated by price floors, and because multiple
bids at the price floor typically imply that the winning bid of the auction is low, the spike
is very pronounced for the middle panel, but mostly disappears in the right panel. The
summary statistics of the auctions for each of the groups are reported in Table B.4. Column












Mean Std. Mean Std. Mean Std.
Panel A: By Auction
Reserve (Mil. Yen) 24.03 104.39 20.92 101.08 22.26 77.14
Winning Bid (Mil. Yen) 22.60 97.64 19.09 95.63 20.71 71.78
Win Bid/Reserve 0.940 0.073 0.911 0.078 0.926 0.083
# of Bids 7.44 3.78 8.00 4.64 6.80 4.21
Incumbent 0.064 0.244 0.043 0.202 0.044 0.204
Obs. 44,993 54,153 11,207
Panel B: By Bidder
# of Participation 24.13 63.23 37.31 85.84 24.75 49.31
# of Wins 2.87 7.88 4.06 10.10 2.80 6.52
Raw Backlog (90-Day) 3.60 20.06 4.55 20.66 3.47 15.83
Raw Backlog (180-Day) 5.89 33.27 6.81 26.86 5.44 21.10
Obs. 15,694 13,350 4,005
Note: Column (1) reports summary statistics for the sample of auctions with missing mass in
the distribution of ∆i,t at zero (71 municipalities). Column (2) reports summary statistics for
the sample with mass at exactly zero (22 municipalities). Column (3) reports sample statistics
for the sample used in Section 5.
Table B.4: Summary Statistics by Auctions and Bidders: All Municipalities.
column (2) corresponds to the sample statistics for those with a mass at 0, and column (3)
corresponds to the sample statistics for the baseline sample used in Section 5.
We now report the regression discontinuity results for all of the auctions in our sample.
Panel (A) of Table B.5 reports the regression discontinuity estimates for bids above the me-
dian winning bid. Panel (B) of Table B.5 reports the estimates for bids below the median
winning bid. Focusing on Panel (A), we find that marginal losing bidders have about 3.5
million yen more in terms of 90-day backlog (column (1)) and about 0.087 higher 90-day
standardized backlog (column (2)) than marginal winners. The estimates are both statisti-
cally significant at the 1% level. Similarly, we find that marginal losing bidders have higher
raw and standardized 180-day backlog (column (3), (4)) than marginal winners, and are
less likely to be an incumbent (column (5)) than marginal winners. The coefficients are all
52
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
90-Day Backlog 180-Day Backlog Incumbent














h 0.013 0.012 0.009 0.013 0.011














h 0.015 0.013 0.014 0.011 0.012
Obs. 188,032 177,304 188,032 177,457 6,864
In addition to the auctions used in the baseline analysis, we include auctions from 70 municipali-
ties with missing mass in the distribution of ∆i,t at zero and those from 18 municipalities with
mass in the distribution of ∆i,t at exactly zero. Panel (A) corresponds to the sample of bids
above the median. Panel (B) corresponds to the sample of bids below the median. Standard
errors are clustered at the auction level and reported in parenthesis. The forcing variable is ∆1.
The table also reports the bandwidth used for the estimation. *, **, and *** respectively denote
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.
Table B.5: Regression Discontinuity Estimates: All Municipalities.
statistically significant at the 1% level. These findings lead us to reject the null hypothesis
of competition for this sample.
The bottom panel of Table B.5 reports the results for bids below the median. While the
regression discontinuity estimate is statistically significant at the 5% level in columns (1),
(3), and (5), the estimated differences between marginal winners and losers are smaller than
in Panel (A). The results suggest the existence of some collusive bidding among this sample,
but likely to a lesser extent than the sample in Panel (A). Overall, the results of Table B.5
suggest that the null of competitive bidding is strongly rejected for the sample of high bids,
but that the evidence is less strong for the sample of low winning bids. This is consistent
with the expectation that there would be more collusion among auctions with high winning
bids than among those with low winning bids.
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C Proofs
C.1 Proofs for Section 3
Proof of Lemma 1. We show that for all η > 0, there exists ε > 0 small enough such
that for all histories hi,t,∣∣∣∣prob(i wins |hi,t and |bi,t − ∧b−i,t| ≤ ε)− 12
∣∣∣∣ ≤ η.
By assumption, D′i(bi|hi) is continuous in bi ∈ [0, 1] and strictly negative for all histories
hi = (θ, zi). Since there are finitely many histories (θ, zi), it follows that there exists ν > 0
such that D′i(bi|hi,t) ≤ −ν for all bi and all histories hi,t. In addition, for all η̂ > 0, there
exists ε small enough that for all b̂i ∈ [bi − ε, bi + ε], |D′i(̂bi|hi,t)−D′i(bi|hi,t)| ≤ η̂.
This implies that for ε small∣∣∣∣prob(i wins |hi,t and |bi,t − ∧b−i,t| ≤ ε)− 12
∣∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣∣ Di(bi,t|hi,t)−Di(bi,t + ε|hi,t)Di(bi,t − ε|hi,t)−Di(bi,t + ε|hi,t) − 12
∣∣∣∣
≤
∣∣∣∣ −εD′i(bi,t|hi,t)− εη̂−2εD′i(bi,t|hi,t) + 2εη̂ − 12
∣∣∣∣
≤
∣∣∣∣ ν − η̂2ν + 2η̂ − 12
∣∣∣∣ .
Lemma 1 follows by taking η̂ small enough. 
Proof of Corrolary 1. Note that, for each x ∈ X,
prob (xi = x |∆i,t ∈ (−ε, 0)) =prob(xi,t = x|i wins and |bi,t − ∧b−i,t| < ε)
=prob(xi,t = x||bi,t − ∧b−i,t| < ε)
prob(i wins |xi,t = x and |bi,t − ∧b−i,t| < ε)
prob(i wins ||bi,t − ∧b−i,t| < ε)
Similarly,
prob (xi = x |∆i,t ∈ (0, ε)) =prob(xi,t = x|i loses and |bi,t − ∧b−i,t| < ε)
=prob(xi,t = x||bi,t − ∧b−i,t| < ε)
prob(i loses |xi,t = x and |bi,t − ∧b−i,t| < ε)
prob(i loses ||bi,t − ∧b−i,t| < ε)
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By Lemma 1, we have that
lim
ε↘0
prob(i wins |xi,t = x and |bi,t − ∧b−i,t| < ε) = lim
ε↘0






prob(i loses |xi,t = x and |bi,t − ∧b−i,t| < ε) = lim
ε↘0




Hence, for each x ∈ X,
lim
ε↘0
|prob (xi = x |∆i,t ∈ (−ε, 0))− prob (xi = x |∆i,t ∈ (0, ε))| = 0.
Since X is finite, for all η > 0 there exists ε > 0 small enough such that for all x ∈ X,
|prob (xi = x |∆i,t ∈ (0, ε))− prob (xi,t = x |∆i,t ∈ (−ε, 0))| < η.
This completes the proof. 
C.2 Proofs for Section 4
C.2.1 Observables under exchangeable winners
Proof of Corollary 2. For each ε > 0, let probσ(·|ε-close) denote the distribution over
histories conditional on event ε-close. Then, for each i ∈ N and each ε > 0, the probability
with which firm i wins an auction under σ conditional on event ε-close satisfies
probσ(i wins|ε-close) = EE,σ
[
probσ(i wins |hi,t and |bi,t − ∧b−i,t| < ε)
∣∣∣ ε-close] (8)
× probσ(|bi,t − ∧b−i,t| < ε|ε-close).
By Proposition 1, it follows that




probσ(i wins |hi,t and |bi,t − ∧b−i,t| < ε)
∣∣∣ ε-close] ≥ 1
2
. (9)
Towards a contradiction, suppose that the result is not true. Hence, there exists a player





prob(j wins |hj,t and |bj,t − ∧b−j,t| < ε)




Note that, for each ε > 0, we have that∑
i∈N
probσ(i wins |ε-close) = 1 and∑
i∈N
probσ(|bi,t − ∧b−i,t| < ε|ε-close) = EE,σ[|{i s.t. |bi,t − ∧b−i,t < ε}|
∣∣ ε-close] ≥ 2.
Using (8), (9) and (10), we obtain that











probσ(|bi,t − ∧b−i,t| < ε|ε-close)
+ ηprobσ(|bj,t − ∧b−j,t| < ε|ε-close)
≥ 1 + η lim sup
ε↘0
probσ(|bj,t − ∧b−j,t| < ε|ε-close) > 1,
a contradiction. 
Sample implications of Corollary 2. We now show that when the sample size is large,
Corollary 2 must hold approximately under the sample distribution of bids and characteristics
b,x.
Data consists of bids and observable characteristics (bt,xt)t∈{0,··· ,T} for auctions happen-
ing at times t ∈ {0, · · · , T}. We denote by p̂rob the sample joint distribution of bids and
characteristics in the data.
Given ε > 0 and x ∈ X, we define Bx,ε ≡ {(i, t) s.t. xi,t = x, |bi,t − ∧b−i,t| ≤ ε} the
subsample of close bids such that the bidders characteristics xi are equal to x. We denote
by Bε ≡ {(i, t) s.t. |bi,t−∧b−i,t| ≤ ε} the sample of close bids. A bidder’s sample probability
of winning conditional on close bids and type x is denoted by P̂x,ε. Formally, we have,
P̂x,ε ≡ p̂rob(i wins | xi = x, |bi − ∧b−i| ≤ ε)
=
|{(i, t) ∈ Bx,ε s.t. bi,t ≺ ∧b−i,t}|
|Bx,ε|
(11)
We make the following assumption about data.





The following result holds:
Proposition C.1 (winning is independent of bidder characteristics). For all η > 0, there




Proof. Take η′ > 0 as given. We know from Proposition 1 that for epsilon small enough, for
all histories hi,t, prob(i wins |hi,t and |bi,t − ∧b−i,t| < ε) ≥ 1/2− η′.
Fix x ∈ X. We show that with probability approaching 1 as |Bε| goes to infinity,
P̂x,ε ≥ 12 − 2η













We denote by {t1, · · · , tn} auctions occurring at times t such that (i, t) ∈ Bx,ε, ordered
according to the timing of the auction. Since the number N of bidders is finite, n grows






1bi,tk≺∧b−i,tk − probi(bi,tk ≺ ∧b−i,tk |i ∈ Ck)

























probi(1bi,tK≺∧b−i,tK |i ∈ CK)
∣∣∣IK] .
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is a submartingale with increments bounded by |N | (the maximum number of bidders in an
auction). It follows for the Azuma-Hoeffding Theorem that as n grows large, with probability













Since X is finite, with probability approaching 1 as |Bε| becomes large, we have that for
all x ∈ X, P̂x,ε ≥ 12 − 2η
′. In addition, since
∑
x′∈X |Bx′,ε|P̂x′,ε = |{(i, a) ∈ Bε s.t. i wins }|,





























Hence by selecting η′ sufficiently small in the first place, it follows that for any η > 0, there
exists ε such that as |Bε| grows large, |P̂x,ε − 12 | ≤ η with probability 1.
A corollary of Proposition C.1 is that our regression discontinuity design remains valid:
conditional on close bids, the sample distribution of covariates is independent of whether the
bidder wins or loses the auction.
Corollary C.1 (close winners and losers have similar characteristics). For all η > 0, there
exists ε > 0 small enough such that with probability approaching 1 as |Bε| goes to infinity,
∀x ∈ X,
∣∣∣p̂rob(xi = x | i wins , |bi − ∧b−i| ≤ ε)− p̂rob(xi = x | i loses , |bi − ∧b−i| ≤ ε)∣∣∣ ≤ η.
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Proof. Observe that
p̂rob(xi = x | i wins , |bi − ∧b−i| ≤ ε) = p̂rob(xi = x | |bi − ∧b−i| ≤ ε)
p̂rob(i wins | xi = x, |bi − ∧b−i| ≤ ε)
p̂rob(i wins | |bi − ∧b−i| ≤ ε)
p̂rob(xi = x | i loses , |bi − ∧b−i| ≤ ε) = p̂rob(xi = x | |bi − ∧b−i| ≤ ε)
p̂rob(i loses | xi = x, |bi − ∧b−i| ≤ ε)
p̂rob(i loses | |bi − ∧b−i| ≤ ε)
.
Therefore,∣∣∣p̂rob(xi = x | i wins , |bi − ∧b−i| ≤ ε)− p̂rob(xi = x | i loses |bi − ∧b−i| ≤ ε)∣∣∣
≤














It follows from Proposition C.1 that for any η′ > 0, there exists ε such that with proba-


























By picking η′ small enough, this implies that with probability approaching 1,∣∣∣p̂rob(xi = x | i wins , |bi − ∧b−i| ≤ ε)− p̂rob(xi = x | i loses , |bi − ∧b−i| ≤ ε)∣∣∣ ≤ η.
C.2.2 Inference from dissimilar winners and losers
We now establish Proposition 2 by establishing its contraposite. Throughout this section we
consider an environment E and an MPE σ such that Vi(0, bw|hi) is Lipschitz continuous in
bw, and Vi(0, bw|hi) is weakly decreasing in bw. We then show that bids must be as if random
conditional on close bids.
We begin by establishing two intermediary lemmas. Recall that continuation value
Vi(ζi, bw|hi) does not depend on winning bid bw when bidder i wins. Hence, we suppress
the dependency of Vi on bw when ζi = 1.
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Lemma C.1 (minimum demand). There exists ν > 0 such that for every history hi = (θ, zi)
and bid bi ∈ [0, 1] in the support of σi|hi, Di(bi|hi) ≥ ν. In addition,
bi − ci + δEσ [Vi(1|hi)− Vi(0,∧b−i|hi) |hi, bi ≺ ∧b−i] ≥ k.
Proof. Since firm i chooses to participate, it must be that
Eσ
[
1bi≺∧b−i(bi − ci + δVi(1|hi)) + 1bi∧b−iδVi(0,∧b−i|hi) |hi
]
− k ≥ Eσ [δVi(0,∧b−i|hi) |hi]
⇐⇒ Eσ
[
1bi≺∧b−i(bi − ci + δVi(1|hi)− δVi(0,∧b−i|hi)) |hi
]
≥ k
⇐⇒ Di(bi|hi) (bi − ci + δEσ [Vi(1|hi)− Vi(0,∧b−i|hi) |hi, bi ≺ ∧b−i]) ≥ k
Since Di ≥ 0, it must be that both left-hand side factors are strictly positive. In addition,
since continuation values are bounded by some constant V , it follows that Di(bi|hi) ≥ k/(1+
2V ). Similarly, since demand is bounded above by 1, we have that
bi − ci + δEσ [Vi(1|hi)− Vi(0,∧b−i|hi) |hi, bi ≺ ∧b−i] ≥ k.
This concludes the proof.
Lemma C.2 (continuous demand). For every history hi = (θ, zi), residual demand Di(bi|hi)
is continuous in bi over (0, 1).
Proof. The proof is by contradiction. Assume that demand Di(·|hi) is discontinuous at bid
b0. There must exist a bidder j and a history hj = (θ, zj) such that firm j bids bj = b0 with
probability q > 0. By Lemma C.1, bidder j must win with probability at least ν > 0 when
bidding b0.
Consider a bidder l and a history hl = (θ, zl) such that history hj has positive probability,
and bidder l loses with positive probability against bidder j when bidder j bids b0. Since
the number of histories is finite, there exists ν1 > 0 such that at any such history hl bidder
j bids b0 with positive probability ν1.
Pick ε > 0 and consider the payoff of bidder l bidding bl ∈ [b0, b0 + ε). Bidder l gets
payoff (excluding participation costs and payoffs upon non-participation)
Ul(bl|hl, cl) = D(bl|hl) (bl − cl + δEσ[Vl(1|hl)− Vl(0,∧b−l|hl) |hl, bl ≺ ∧b−l]) .
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We know from Lemma C.1 that
bl − cl + δEσ [Vl(1|hl)− Vl(0,∧b−l|hl) |hl, bl ≺ ∧b−l] ≥ k.
The assumption that the continuation value of losers, Vl(0,∧b−l|hl) is decreasing in ∧b−l
implies that
Eσ [Vl(0,∧b−l|hl) |hl, bl − ε ≺ ∧b−l] ≤ Eσ [Vl(0,∧b−l|hl) |hl, bl ≺ ∧b−l] .
Altogether, it follows that for every η > 0, there exists ε > 0 small enough that
bl − ε− cl+δEσ [Vl(1|hl)− Vl(0,∧b−l|hl) |hl, bl − ε ≺ ∧b−l]
≥ bl − cl + δEσ [Vl(1|hl)− Vl(0,∧b−l|hl) |hl, bl ≺ ∧b−l]− η ≥ k − η.
Hence, it follows that by bidding bl − ε, bidder l gets a payoff
Ul(bl − ε|hl, cl) = D(bl − ε|hl) (bl − ε− cl + δEσ[Vi(1|hl)− Vi(0,∧b−l|hl) |hl, bl − ε ≺ ∧b−l])
≥ Ul(bl|hl, cl)− η + ν1(k − η)
Since ν1 is fixed, it follows that for ε small enough Ul(bl−ε|hl, cl) > Ul(bl|hl, cl). Hence, there
exists ε small such that bidder l does not bid in [b0, b0+ε]. Since there are only finite histories,
this implies that there exists ε > 0 such that no bidder l that loses against bidder j bidding
b0 bids in the range [b0, b0 + ε]. Hence, bidder j would benefit from bidding b0 + ε/2 rather
than b0. This contradicts the assumption that σ is an MPE and concludes the proof.
Finally we establish that Proposition 1 continues to hold when value functions Vi(ζi, bw|hi)
are not sensitive and do not internalize competitors’ profits.
Lemma C.3. Consider an environment E and an MPE σ such that bidding behavior is not
sensitive and does not internalize competitors’ revenues. For all η > 0 there exists ε > 0
small enough such that, for all histories hi,t = (θt, zi,t) and bid bi,t ∈ (ε, 1− ε),
probσ(i wins |hi,t and |bi,t − ∧b−i,t| < ε) ≥ 1/2− η.
Proof. Consider an environment E and an MPE σ such that bidding behavior is not sensitive
and does not internalize competitors’ revenues. Fix a history hi,t = (θt, zi,t) of firm i. Let
bi,t < r = 1 denote firm i’s bid at this history when her cost are ci,t. For any bid b, let
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Ui(b|hi,t, ci,t) denote i’s payoff from bidding b at history hi,t when her cost is ci,t:
Ui(b|hi,t, ci,t) = Eσ
[
1∧b−i,tb(b− ci,t + δVi(1|hi,t) + (1− 1∧b−i,tb)δVi(0,∧b−i,t|hi,t) |hi,t
]
− k.
Since bid bi,t is optimal, for all ε > 0 it must be that,
Ui(bi,t|hi,t, ci,t) ≥ Ui(bi,t + ε|hi,t, ci,t)
⇐⇒ (Di(bi,t|hi,t)−Di(bi,t + ε|hi,t))(bi,t − κ+εi,t ) ≥ Di(bi,t + ε|hi,t)× ε (12)
where κ+εi,t ≡ ci,t−δEσ[Vi(1|hi,t)−Vi(0,∧b−i,t|hi,t)|hi,t, bi,t+ ε  ∧b−i,t  bi,t]. Since Di(·|hi,t)
is continuous at bi,t (Lemma C.2), and since Di(bi,t|hi,t) > 0 (Lemma C.1) it must be that
bi,t − κ+εi,t > 0 for ε > 0 small.
Similarly, for all ε > 0 it must be that
Ui(bi,t|hi,t, ci,t) ≥ Ui(bi,t − ε|hi,t, ci,t)
⇐⇒ (Di(bi,t − ε|hi,t)−Di(bi,t|hi,t))(bi,t − κ+εi,t ) ≤ Di(bi,t − ε|hi,t)× ε (13)
− (Di(bi,t − ε|hi,t)−Di(bi,t|hi,t))(κ+εi,t − κ−εi,t )
where κ−εi,t ≡ ci,t − δEσ[Vi(1|hi,t)− Vi(0,∧b−i,t|hi,t)|hi,t, bi,t  ∧b−i,t  bi,t − ε].
Using (12) and (13), together with bi,t − κ+εi,t > 0, we have that
probσ(i wins |hi,t and |bi,t − ∧b−i,t| < ε)
=
Di(bi,t|hi,t)−Di(bi,t + ε|hi,t)
Di(bi,t − ε|hi,t)−Di(bi,t + ε|hi,t)
≥ Di(bi,t + ε|hi,t)







SinceDi(·|θt, zi,t) is continuous on [0, 1], it is uniformly continuous. Since there are finitely
many (θ, zi), for every γD > 0 there exists ε > 0 such that, for all i, θ, zi and for all b, b′ with
|b− b′| ≤ 2ε, Di(b|θ, zi)−Di(b′|θ, zi) < γD.
Moreover, since Vi(0, θ,∧b−i) is Lipschitz continuous and decreasing in ∧b−i, and since
there are finitely many states θ, there exists a Lipschitz constant L > 0 such that, for all
i, θ, zi, ci,t, κ+εi,t − κ−εi,t ≥ −2εL.
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Using (14), for every γD > 0, there exists ε̃ > 0 such that, for all ε < ε̃,
probσ(i wins |hi,t and |bi,t − ∧b−i,t| < ε)
≥ Di(bi,t + ε|hi,t)
Di(bi,t + ε|hi,t) + γD + 2γDL+Di(bi,t + ε|hi,t)
≥ ν − γD
ν + γD2L+ ν − γD
, (15)
where the second inequality uses the inequality Di(bi,t + ε|hi,t) ≥ Di(bi,t|hi,t)− γD ≥ ν − γD
(Lemma C.1). Picking γD small, we obtain that probσ(i wins |hi,t and |bi,t − ∧b−i,t| < ε) ≥
1/2− η.
Proof of Proposition 2. Assume that continuation values are not sensitive, and do
not internalize competitors’ revenue. Together, Lemmas C.3, and Corollary 2 imply that
Corollary 1 must hold. Hence, if Corollary 1 does not hold, it must be that bidding behavior
is either sensitive, or internalizes competitors’ revenue. 
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